History of the Jurisdictional Defect in 2025 ONCA 90: Rule 2.1 Applied Twice

This analysis does not address the underlying merits of Md Ahasanullah Chowdhury’s claims. The viability of those claims is distinct from the structural issue in Chowdhury v. Unity Health Toronto, 2025 ONCA 90, and the case preceding it, 2024 ONSC 5508. The focus is strictly the methodology used at both judicial levels to dispose of the file and the resulting decision.

The Divisional Court decision, 2024 ONSC 5508, identified the jurisdictional issue at the outset. From para. 3:

[3] In response, I gave the following directions:

Mr. Chowdhury has submitted a notice of motion for leave to appeal three decisions of the Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC). The IPC and Unity Health Toronto have requested that the Court initiate the process under r. 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

There is an issue of jurisdiction. It does not appear that there is a right to seek leave to appeal those decisions to this Court. The Registrar is therefore directed to give notice that the Court is considering making an order under r. 2.1, dismissing this motion. Mr. Chowdhury is encouraged to specify, in his submissions under r. 2.1, what statutory provision or rule he relies on to bring his motion for leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

Para. 4 sets out the moving party’s responses to the notice:

[4] I have considered all of the moving party’s responses to the notice under r. 2.1 and do not attempt to recite them all here. Among other things, the moving party submits as follows:

(i) that he is self-represented and, “Besides the electronic tortures/ experiments or assault, the realities of circumstances are that [he] is under surveillance in all aspects of physical, including computer and online environments”;

(ii) that in another decision of this Court, Chowdhury v. Toronto Police Services Board, 2018 ONSC 3587, at para. 20-21, the Court “endorsed” his submission that the installation of a cellular antenna on the roof of his home “for the purposes of surveillance, mind control, experimentation and harassment” infringed upon his rights guaranteed by ss. 2(a) and (b), 7 and 8 of the Charter (even though the Court expressly declined to consider those arguments at para. 21);

(iii) that he pursues all avenues of review, including at the IPC, and his notice of motion for leave to appeal is based on a legal and constitutional issue;

(iv) that there have been significant amendments to the summary judgment rule – r. 20 – and asks whether “it is deserved that questions are answered by applying relevant legal principles only under the court considering against Rule 20 summary judgment procedure?”;

(v) that he asked whether there are issues of national concern, democracy, the national interest, and/or national security that deserve the consideration of a special case.

The final disposal of the matter was grounded in jurisdiction, as stated in para. 6:

[6] Subrule 2.1.01(1) authorizes the Court to dismiss a proceeding as frivolous or vexatious or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. However, r. 2.1 should only be used for “the clearest of cases”: Scaduto v. The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONCA 733, at para. 8. This is such a case. Although I understand that the moving party is self-represented and encourages this Court to step in due to the nature of his concerns, those submissions do not give this Court jurisdiction. There is no jurisdiction to seek leave to appeal to this Court from a decision of the IPC.

The submissions recited in para. 4 were available on the record. The court could have examined those submissions against the established Rule 2.1 test and, if satisfied the test was met, dismissed the motion as vexatious on that basis alone without addressing jurisdiction. It did not. After directing notice under Rule 2.1 specifically because of the jurisdictional issue (para. 3), it rested the dismissal on the pure jurisdictional defect (para. 6).

On the subsequent motion for leave to appeal, the Court of Appeal panel restated the same jurisdictional conclusions.

In 2025 ONCA 90, the panel ruled there was no jurisdiction in the Divisional Court, and held that there was likewise no jurisdiction in the Court of Appeal to hear an appeal from that dismissal (outside the narrow circumstance of improper declination of jurisdiction, which was not present). It concluded that 2024 ONSC 5508 “was correct in finding that no appeal lies to the Divisional Court from a decision of the Information and Privacy Commissioner.”

The panel then stated: “The clear lack of jurisdiction is sufficient to render the motion for leave to appeal an abuse of process.” The motion was dismissed under Rule 2.1.

The Court of Appeal panel had the same option as the lower court. The submissions were on the record. If the record supported a freestanding finding that the motion was frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process under the established test for Rule 2.1, the panel could have said so directly. Alternatively, it could have treated the absence of jurisdiction as the discrete defect it is and disposed of the leave motion on that basis alone. Either route would have ended the proceeding without equating a pure jurisdictional defect with an abuse of process.

Instead, both levels utilized Rule 2.1 to address a jurisdictional defect. The Court of Appeal expressly held that the lack of jurisdiction was itself sufficient to constitute an abuse of process under the rule.

Collins v. Ontario, 2017 ONCA 317, relying on Simpson v. The Chartered Professional Accountants of Ontario, 2016 ONCA 806, held that Rule 2.1 does not replace a motion to quash an appeal for want of jurisdiction or for lack of merit. The approach in Chowdhury departs from that boundary.

The result, via a panel decision, is that a jurisdictional defect may be reclassified as an abuse of process under Rule 2.1, thereby bypassing the formal procedural requirements of a motion to quash. Chowdhury is the recorded instance of that reclassification.

Access the consolidated public records, dockets, and procedural analyses associated with this matter below.

Supreme Court of Canada (SCC)

• Formatted SCC Docket 42381
• Bulletin of Proceedings (Official)
• Official SCC Docket 42381

1. Case Overviews & Timelines

• Case Overview: Supreme Court of Canada Docket 42381, 2026 ONCA 246 and 2.1B (2025 ONCA 90)
• Wrong-Forum and “Abuse of Process”: Amstar (2025 ONCA 493) and Bernard Property (2019 ONCA 830)
• “Or” vs. “Or Otherwise”: Scaduto (2015 ONCA 733), Raji (2015 ONSC 801), and the Language of Rule 2.1.01

2. Constitutional Limits & Delegated Authority

• Jurisprudence of the Administrative Reverse Onus: Rule 2.1 vs. Established Precedent
• Rule 2.1, Section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, and the Administrative Reverse Onus
• Rule 2.1 and the Automatic Stay: A Procedural Tension with Rule 2.01
• O. Reg. 322/24: Form 2.1A and the 2024 Amendments to Rule 2.1
• The Reverse Onus of Rule 2.1: The Practical Effect of the Automatic Stay in O. Reg. 322/24
• Form 2.1B and the Reverse Onus: Colourability and the Limits of Delegated Authority

4. Jurisdiction, Forum & Procedural Mechanics

• Rule 2.1.01 and Jurisdiction: Simpson (2016 ONCA 806), Collins (2017 ONCA 317) vs. Chowdhury
• Jurisdiction and the Initiation of Rule 2.1 Dismissals
• Rule 21.01 vs. Rule 2.1.01: "A Judge" vs. "The Court"
• Case Conference and Management: Scheduling as Adjudication (2.1B)
• Jurisdictional Contrast: Alberta, Quebec, and British Columbia
• Amstar (2025 ONCA 493) and Ingarra (2026 ONCA 139): When Jurisdiction Becomes "Frivolous"

5. Family Rule 1.4 & Rule 2.1

• Rule 1.4, Rule 2.1 and the Rules of Procedure: Can Ontario's Rules Committees Override the Common Law?
• O. Reg. 310/26 and Family Rule 1.4: The Shifting Framework of Summary Dismissals

Statutory References

• Appendix: Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure — Statutory Reference via Ontario e-Laws