Clearly Lacking Jurisdiction: “Clearly”, Vavilov, and Rule 2.1
In Chowdhury v. Unity Health Toronto, 2025 ONCA 90, and subsequently in Seo v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2026 ONCA 246, the Court of Appeal for Ontario compressed two distinct legal concepts—statutory jurisdiction and abuse of process—into a single sentence:
“A purported appeal that clearly does not engage the jurisdiction of this court is an abuse of process and is properly dismissed under r. 2.1.01: Chowdhury v. Unity Health Toronto, 2025 ONCA 90, at para. 4.”
The analytical pivot of that sentence is a single adverb: clearly.
Ordinarily, a lack of appellate jurisdiction may be addressed through a motion to quash under s. 134(3) of the Courts of Justice Act. The court may also raise jurisdiction on its own initiative. In either case, the jurisdictional question is determined by reference to the governing statutory framework. By introducing the qualifier “clearly,” the court treats an obvious jurisdictional defect as a different legal category—one that ceases to be a threshold routing defect and becomes a substantive “abuse of process” subject to abbreviated dismissal under Rule 2.1.01.
Calling an act “clearly murder” does not transform it into a different offence; it remains murder. Likewise, calling a defect “clearly jurisdictional” does not transform it into abuse of process. The qualifier describes the certainty of the conclusion, not the legal nature of the issue or the procedure governing its determination.
The question is whether attaching an intensifying modifier to a jurisdictional error can lawfully alter its substantive character or bypass the statutory procedure for determining jurisdiction.
The Modal Fallacy: Epistemic Certainty Versus Legal Nature
Jurisdiction is binary. A court either possesses statutory authority to entertain a proceeding or it does not. Whether that absence of authority is immediately apparent or emerges only after complex argument describes the epistemic certainty of the panel—how quickly or easily the judge perceives the defect—not the substantive nature of the defect itself.
In earlier decisions, including Simpson v. The Chartered Professional Accountants of Ontario, 2016 ONCA 806, and Collins v. Ontario, 2017 ONCA 317, the Court of Appeal recognized that a lack of jurisdiction and an abuse of process under Rule 2.1 are distinct inquiries. Rule 2.1 was enacted to address proceedings that are on their face frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of the court’s process, not to serve as a general substitute for jurisdictional motions.
In Simpson, at para. 43, the Court of Appeal expressly distinguished Rule 2.1 from the ordinary procedure for quashing an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. In Collins, at para. 19, the court reaffirmed that distinction, emphasizing that lack of merit alone does not justify Rule 2.1 dismissal. Yet in Chowdhury, at para. 4, clear absence of jurisdiction itself became sufficient to establish abuse of process. The progression raises an obvious question: what happened to the independent requirement of abuse?
A litigant who selects the wrong statutory appeal route between the Divisional Court and the Court of Appeal commits a technical error of statutory routing. The clarity of the statutory bar to an appellate panel does not convert a mistaken reading of the Courts of Justice Act into vexatious misconduct.
The Fallacy of Tiered Jurisdiction in Supreme Court Jurisprudence
Supreme Court jurisprudence has distinguished the legal nature of jurisdictional questions from the procedural frameworks used to determine them. Although clarity may affect how a jurisdictional objection is addressed, it does not necessarily alter the substantive legal character of the objection itself.
First, in the arbitration and forum-selection context (Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des consommateurs, 2007 SCC 34; Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller, 2020 SCC 16), the Supreme Court of Canada distinguishes between jurisdictional challenges that are “clear” on a superficial review of the record and those requiring further evidentiary inquiry. In that context, clarity may determine whether a court resolves a jurisdictional objection immediately or leaves the question to the arbitrator. Neither decision treats the clarity of the jurisdictional objection itself as establishing abuse of process.
Second, in administrative law, courts and litigants long attempted to isolate a special category of “clear,” “manifest,” or “true questions of jurisdiction” to justify departing from the standard analytical framework. In Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. Alberta Teachers’ Association, 2011 SCC 61, and conclusively in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, the Supreme Court dismantled that artificial tiering. Although Vavilov concerned standards of review in administrative law rather than Rule 2.1 screening, its rejection of a distinct category of “true questions of jurisdiction” illustrates the danger of using jurisdictional labels to alter an otherwise applicable legal framework. The analogous concern here is whether describing a jurisdictional defect as “clear” permits courts to bypass the ordinary framework for determining appellate jurisdiction.
The Citation Paradox: Bernard Property Maintenance v. Taylor
The tension in equating “clear” lack of jurisdiction with a patent abuse of process is illustrated by the authorities relied upon to establish that clarity.
Under Raji v. Borden Ladner Gervais LLP, 2015 ONSC 801, and Scaduto v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONCA 733, Rule 2.1 is confined to the clearest cases where the abusive character of the proceeding is apparent on the face of the pleading itself.
In Bernard Property Maintenance v. Taylor, 2019 ONCA 830, the Court of Appeal expressly found that the proceeding had been filed in the wrong court (para. 2). Rather than dismissing it under Rule 2.1, the panel reconstituted itself as a Divisional Court panel to determine the matter under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act (para. 4). This was not a theoretical remedy. The Court of Appeal exercised the power, with the assent of the Chief Justice of the Superior Court of Justice and the consent of the parties. Although the court described reconstitution as a practically abandoned procedure, it employed that mechanism because it had previously granted leave to appeal, a stay of the order below, and an extension of time (para. 4).
An additional fact appears at para. 8. The underlying appeal had already been dismissed as “manifestly devoid of merit, frivolous and/or vexatious” under Rule 21.01(3)(d). Despite that finding, the appellate panel addressed the jurisdictional defect through the corrective procedure, examined the authority for the earlier dismissal (paras. 12–16), and reviewed its merits (paras. 17–28).
In Amstar Pool ILP v. Tweneboa-Kodua, 2025 ONCA 493, the Court of Appeal cited Bernard at paras. 2 and 3 to establish the wrong appellate route (para. 6), without mentioning the remedy detailed in para. 4. It then characterized the jurisdictional defect itself as sufficient to render the motion frivolous and abusive under Rule 2.1 at para. 8.
The procedural treatment differs completely. The precedent Amstar invoked shows that a jurisdictional error was corrected through judicial reconstitution, even where the underlying proceeding had already been found frivolous. Rather than invoking Rule 2.1, the Bernard panel exercised jurisdiction as a Divisional Court panel and adjudicated the matter. Amstar did not address that aspect of the earlier decision.
The issue is not whether Bernard required every wrong-forum proceeding to be corrected. It is why Amstar relied on Bernard to establish the jurisdictional defect while leaving completely unexplained the earlier court’s different treatment of that defect, including its exercise of a corrective power despite an existing finding of frivolousness.
A Motion Versus All Other Cases
In Seo v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2026 ONCA 246, at para. 6, the Court of Appeal explained the jurisdictional defect by interpreting three provisions of the Courts of Justice Act—ss. 6(1)(a), 6(1)(b), and 21(5)—and relying on Bernard Property Maintenance v. Taylor, 2019 ONCA 830, 148 O.R. (3d) 494, at paras. 1–3.
The distinction turned on whether an order of a single Divisional Court judge was made “on a motion,” permitting panel review under s. 21(5), or fell within “all other cases,” requiring leave to appeal under s. 6(1)(a).
The underlying judicial review had not been dismissed; it remained in abeyance pending further administrative proceedings. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal dismissed the attempted appeal under Rule 2.1.
The contrast with Bernard is significant. There, the Court of Appeal addressed a jurisdictional error through judicial reconstitution rather than treating the incorrect appellate route as an abuse of process.
The question is whether a jurisdictional defect requiring statutory interpretation and reliance on reported appellate authority can properly be characterized as a self-evident abuse of process, rather than an issue for ordinary jurisdictional determination.
The Procedural Consequence
Rebranding a “clear” jurisdictional error as an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.01 produces concrete procedural consequences. Rather than resolving jurisdiction through an ordinary motion to quash under s. 134(3) of the Courts of Justice Act, the court may initiate Rule 2.1.01 screening on its own initiative or following a request submitted through Form 2.1A. Once Form 2.1B is issued at the court’s direction, Rule 2.1.01(7) automatically stays the proceeding before a final determination of abuse, and the appellant is ordinarily limited to a written response of no more than 10 pages within 15 days.
The anticipated justification is that an appeal with no possible statutory foundation is necessarily frivolous. But that reasoning collapses two distinct inquiries into one. If the obviousness of a jurisdictional defect is itself sufficient to establish frivolousness, the independent Rule 2.1 requirement ceases to perform any meaningful limiting function. Every sufficiently obvious jurisdictional objection becomes eligible for summary abuse-of-process treatment, regardless of whether anything independently abusive has occurred.
The result is an uncodified two-tier jurisdictional regime: ordinary jurisdictional defects are adjudicated through motions to quash, while jurisdictional defects deemed “clear” are routed through an exceptional mechanism designed for vexatious litigants. Whether the Courts of Justice Act authorizes the use of an adverb to convert a statutory routing error into an abuse of process remains an unresolved threshold question.
Directory of Records
Access the consolidated public records, dockets, and procedural analyses associated with this matter below.
Supreme Court of Canada (SCC)
1. Case Overviews & Timelines
- Case Overview: Supreme Court of Canada Docket 42381, 2026 ONCA 246 and 2.1B (2025 ONCA 90)
- History of the Jurisdictional Defect in Chowdhury (2025 ONCA 90): Rule 2.1 Applied Twice
- Wrong-Forum and “Abuse of Process”: Amstar (2025 ONCA 493) and Bernard Property (2019 ONCA 830)
- “Or” vs. “Or Otherwise”: Scaduto (2015 ONCA 733), Raji (2015 ONSC 801), and the Language of Rule 2.1.01
- Reverse Onus and One Opportunity: Raji (2015 ONSC 801) and Scaduto (2015 ONCA 733)
2. Constitutional Limits & Delegated Authority
- Jurisprudence of the Administrative Reverse Onus: Rule 2.1 vs. Established Precedent
- Rule 2.1, Section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, and the Administrative Reverse Onus
- Rule 2.1 and the Automatic Stay: A Procedural Tension with Rule 2.01
- O. Reg. 322/24: Form 2.1A and the 2024 Amendments to Rule 2.1
- The Reverse Onus of Rule 2.1: The Practical Effect of the Automatic Stay in O. Reg. 322/24
- Form 2.1B and the Reverse Onus: Colourability and the Limits of Delegated Authority
3. Jurisdiction, Forum & Procedural Mechanics
- Rule 2.1.01 and Jurisdiction: Simpson (2016 ONCA 806), Collins (2017 ONCA 317) vs. Chowdhury
- Jurisdiction and the Initiation of Rule 2.1 Dismissals
- Rule 21.01 vs. Rule 2.1.01: "A Judge" vs. "The Court"
- Case Conference and Management: Scheduling as Adjudication (2.1B)
- Jurisdictional Contrast: Alberta, Quebec, and British Columbia
- Amstar (2025 ONCA 493) and Ingarra (2026 ONCA 139): When Jurisdiction Becomes "Frivolous"
4. Family Rule 1.4 & Rule 2.1
- Rule 1.4, Rule 2.1 and the Rules of Procedure: Can Ontario's Rules Committees Override the Common Law?
- O. Reg. 310/26 and Family Rule 1.4: The Shifting Framework of Summary Dismissals
- The Automatic Stay and Reverse Onus in O. Reg. 310/26: How Rule 1.4 Halts a Case Before the Merits Are Heard
- Party-Initiated Summary Screening: From Civil Amendments to Rule 1.4 in O. Reg. 310/26
- Form 1.4A and Colourability: The Limits of Delegated Authority
- Primary Legislation, Delegated Rules, and Rule 1.4: A Comparative Provincial Analysis
- From Judicial Stay to Automatic Stay: Purcaru (2016 ONSC 1609) and Rule 1.4
- Dowson v. R., Katz Group, Auer, Abrametz, Civil Rule 2.1, and Family Rule 1.4: Can Ontario's Rules Committees Create an Automatic Stay?
- Rule 1.4, Rule 2.1, and Jurisdictional Screening: Chowdhury, Amstar, Simpson, and Collins
- Family Rule 1.4(12): Automatic Stays, Judicial Discretion, and Procedural Safeguards
Statutory References